In 2015, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition against Houthi rebels in Yemen and requested Pakistan to send troops, ships and aircraft. Pakistan had long been a close partner of Saudi Arabia and had also received economic assistance from the kingdom. Initially, there were expectations that Pakistan would join the coalition.
However, after a five-day parliamentary debate, Pakistan’s parliament unanimously passed a resolution declaring that the country would remain neutral in the Yemen conflict so that it could play a diplomatic role.
The resolution also stated that Pakistan would stand shoulder to shoulder with Saudi Arabia if the kingdom’s territorial integrity or Mecca and Medina faced a threat. The decision was disappointing for Saudi Arabia.
Pakistan refused direct military participation in the Yemen conflict. Critics described the decision as an example of breaking a commitment, while supporters argued that Pakistan had taken domestic divisions and regional balance into account. It also avoided worsening relations with Iran.
The episode demonstrated how Pakistan could announce cooperation but avoid entering a high-risk war when the potential costs became clear.
In August 2026, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey signed the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement. It stated that an attack on one would be considered an attack on all. Earlier, in 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had also signed a bilateral defence agreement. Pakistan had deployed troops and air defence systems in Saudi Arabia.
When Houthi rebels increased drone and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia in 2026, Pakistan maintained its distance from direct military action. The defence minister warned that the agreement could be invoked if the conflict spread into Saudi territory. Later, the Foreign Ministry clarified that there was currently no discussion about military action.
Pakistan instead pursued diplomatic efforts and appealed to Iran to stop the Houthis. It said it would defend Saudi territory but refused to become involved in fighting in Yemen. Critics viewed this as a repeat of the 2015 approach. Analysts said Pakistan was clearly defining its limits: it would protect holy sites and Saudi territory but would avoid becoming entangled in a prolonged war on foreign soil.
A similar dynamic emerged in the Arabian Sea.
On September 15, 2026, Pakistani vessel PNS Hunain collided with an Indian Navy warship in the northern Arabian Sea. According to the Indian Navy, the Pakistani vessel approached at high speed, carried out unsafe manoeuvres and collided with the Indian ship. PNS Hunain was damaged and returned to port, while the Indian vessel continued its mission.
India described the incident as a violation of Article 10 of the 1991 agreement, which provides for maintaining a distance of three nautical miles. Pakistan also lodged a protest and accused the Indian vessel of aggressive behaviour.
The incident too became an example of the pattern of “getting aggressive and then stepping back.” The Pakistani vessel suffered damage while attempting to approach and subsequently returned to port. Both countries lodged diplomatic protests, but the situation did not escalate further.
Pakistan’s history contains several other examples. In 1999, the Kargil intrusion took place a few months after the Lahore Declaration and was later followed by a withdrawal. Despite several agreements with India, tensions along the border and allegations of terrorism continued.
Similarly, despite long-standing military cooperation with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan avoided direct participation in war in both 2015 and 2026.
These events indicate that Pakistan often makes major commitments, whether through military alliances or diplomatic support, but domestic politics, economic constraints and strategic interests can lead it to step back when the actual costs emerge. Some describe this as strategic pragmatism, while others view it as a lack of reliability.
The pattern reflects the complexities of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Islamabad seeks economic and political benefits from allied countries while trying to avoid prolonged military entanglements. The Mecca agreement, the Yemen crisis and the naval confrontation in the Arabian Sea illustrate this approach.
Going forward, whenever risks rise, Pakistan is likely to favour diplomacy and limited support over direct military involvement. Pakistan maintains that this is less about “running away” and more about “risk management.” However, repeated retreats from high-risk commitments could affect the confidence of its allies.
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